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Chairman’s summing-up 
François Heisbourg* 
o introduce a vital topic replete with semantic and political difficulties, we were fortunate to 
benefit from a number of excellent presentations. 
Delivering his paper on “The multiple crises in Dutch parallel societies”, Rob de Wijk (from 
Clingendael and the Royal Military Academy) laid emphasis on four points: 
•  The frustration of reasonably well-educated middle classes in parallel societies at being blocked 
from climbing the social ladder. This, rather than the difficulties of the underprivileged, has been a 
major source of radicalisation; 
•  The importance of second-generation citizens of Moroccan (often Rifan berber) origin in Dutch 
parallel societies; 
•  The existence of ‘virtual ummas’ motivated by external causes (rather than by endogenous 
economic or social grievances) which find a ready home in the infrastructure of parallel societies; 
•  The need for innovative approaches to acquire inside knowledge of such groups, notably in terms 
of the role of social workers. 
Amel Boubekeur, from CEPS and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS, in Paris) 
underscored points made in the paper she wrote with Samir Amghar (also from EHESS), on “The Role 
of Islam?” in Europe’s multiple crises. She recalled the weak role of Islam in France’s ‘crise des 
banlieues’. Conversely, she singled out three roles of Islam in French and European society: Islam as a 
source of integration (‘embourgeoisement’), Islam as a territory in which to retreat (a quiet ‘lieu de 
repli’) and Islam as a vector of jihad.  
Alexei Malashenko, from the Carnegie Centre in Moscow, pointed out that while Russia has had its 
share of suicide bombings, it has hardly had any burning banlieues. He made the point that ‘parallel 
societies’ outside the modern economic mainstream were something the USSR and especially Russia 
were rather accustomed to. In the case of Moscow, with a population of Muslim origin of some 1.5-2 
million, mostly from the Caucasus, there was little ethnic ghettoisation, and only weak community 
organisation (setting aside criminal gangs). As a first generation population, they had strong links to 
their family and friends back home and did not suffer high unemployment. Moscow’s immigration 
situation was different from the current situation in France and most other European countries – 
notwithstanding the existence of anti-Caucasian and anti-Muslim racism. 
Speaking from his paper, “Islam in Russia in 2020”, he noted that Islam was often linked to 
nationalism – ‘burning regions’, rather than ‘burning banlieues’. With between 14.5 and 20 million 
Muslims, Russia could witness major, converging troubles with its Muslim ‘south’ broadly defined 
(from the Volga to the Northern Caucasus) or a series of successive explosions in its individual 
Muslim republics. 
Responding to the question arising from the relative absence of home-grown jihadi attacks in the US, 
Steve Simon (Council of Foreign Relations) noted the particular characteristics of Islam in the US: an 
above national average median income of $50,000 and a proportionately high representation in the 
professions. However, complacency about America’s ‘immunity’ would be misplaced, given a number 
of factors: anti-Muslim sentiment had become more acceptable since 9/11; generational issues were 
arising with a quest for salafist-type purity among some of the Muslim young; not necessarily 
effective but damaging because of indiscriminate sweeps by the FBI; the over-representation of 
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Muslims in the prison population (19% in the New York state prison system). Concerning Europe’s 
integration problems, he discounted the corresponding neo-conservative literature, with its odd mix of 
Spengler and Churchill appearing in American bookstores of late (inter alia “While Europe Slept”): 
the ‘banlieues’ were more about Karl Marx than about Bin Laden, notwithstanding the realities of 
political under-representation of the Muslim population. 
In the first round of discussion, a representative of the International Crisis Group underscored the 
findings of the ICG’s recent report “La France face à ses Musulmans: émeutes, jihadisme et 
dépolitisation”, noted the waning of political Islam in the French banlieues, stating that M. Sarkozy is 
wrong in his attempts to build up Islamic organisations. On Russian issues, he asked, inter alia, how 
the war in Chechnya has affected the attitudes of Muslims in other parts of Russia. An American 
participant with expert knowledge of the French scene criticised the juxtaposition of the ‘burning 
banlieues’ and ‘suicide bombers’: the two expressions do not actually go together. Terrorism is largely 
tied to external causes while the burning of suburbs was a result of internal factors, going well beyond 
issues related to either Islam or terrorism. He emphasised the need for growth in Europe to alleviate 
socio-economic disaffection. 
A Danish discussant remarked that 70% or so of Danish public opinion supported both the publication 
of the cartoons and the policy of the Danish government: the reaction of mainstream European opinion 
needed to be watched. 
In the panel response, Alexei Malashenko noted the low level of Muslim solidarity with the Chechens, 
outside the immediate vicinity of Chechnya. However, he singled out the apparent popularity of 
Osama Bin Laden in much of the Muslim population. 
Rob de Wijk and the Chairman both underscored the similarities rather than the differences between 
the situations in European countries: the better educated groups go radical and global; the less 
educated ones riot locally. In other words, simply improving conditions in the neighbourhoods is not 
going to deal with terrorism. He joked about the ‘I’ in ‘ICG’: it was a sign of the times that 
‘international’ concern converges with internal issues. 
In the second round of discussion, a former US official reacted against the use of the expression 
‘political Islam’ by the ICG: it was a play on words to indicate that political Islam was on the wane 
while at the same time noting the rise of radical expression and organisation. What was on the wane 
was traditional religious pressure groups. He shared the concern of those worried about the reactions 
of the mainstream population. Finally, he drew a parallel in both sociological and organisational terms 
between the Jihadis and the Bolsheviks. 
Another participant queried the role of politicians in coping with the current problems in The 
Netherlands, and, more broadly, wondered about the possibility of promoting more inclusive policies. 
This followed a remark by the Chairman on the French government’s ‘Terrorism White Paper’, which 
supports policies of inclusiveness of the population as a whole (along ‘July 7’ lines in London) rather 
than policies of mobilising simply majority support (e.g. the ‘70%’ of pro-cartoon Danes). A member 
of CEPS echoed another participant’s query about successful policies: was Belgium doing something 
right as compared to the Netherlands? 
Finally, a representative of the ICG emphasised the basics of fighting terrorism: good intelligence, 
good policing and the like, rather than relying on socio-economic programmes which are necessary 
but for other reasons. 
The panel picked up the Bolshevik analogy and the remark by the ICG representative. Rob de Wijk 
noted that social workers and law-and-order officers have to learn to work together to improve the 
overall intelligence position. He expressed limited approval of the record of some Dutch politicians. 
Commenting on Miss Ayaan Hirsan Ali’s role, he remarked that she may be courageous, but that she 
may also have further radicalised an already polarised situation. CHAIRMAN’S SUMMING-UP | 3 
Amel Boubekeur remarked that the depoliticisation of structures does not imply the depoliticisation of 
people and asked: what will follow the November riots in France, since traditional polities do not 
work? 
Steve Simon eschewed the apparent simplicity of ‘radical = global’, ‘rioting = local’ paradigm. Local 
situations can prompt change in global visions, as occurred with young Che Guevara’s motorcycle 
tour of South America. He emphasised the importance of conferring citizenship in order to enable 
political activity. Finally, he recalled that areas with large concentrations of youth – and the banlieues 
are places with a large share of youths – lead to rowdy collective behaviour… 
Alexei Malashenko denounced Salafism as a challenge for both Islam and the world. Communism was 
an ideology which could be got rid of: it is more difficult to deal with a religious belief. 
In his closing speech, the Chairman strongly supported the concern about the reactions of the majority 
of the population. He also remarked that the period of violence in America’s black ghettos in the 
1960s came to a close when the mainstream political parties took the corresponding issues to heart – 
not as a result of the activity of more narrowly-based organisations such as the Black Panthers or the 
SNCC (Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee). 
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The Role of Islam in Europe: Multiple Crises? 
Amel Boubekeur and Samir Amghar* 
he contemporary history of Muslims in Europe extends over 50 years. Until the early 1980s, 
when a new generation of young Muslims born in Europe began rising to prominence, their 
presence was not particularly visible and European public policies tended to categorise them as 
temporary immigrants. Policies intended to curb discrimination and unemployment were developed 
along ethnic lines (in particular French migration and social policies affecting the beur children of 
immigrant parents from North Africa), sparking social discontent and rioting. Beginning in the 1990s, 
public discourse increasingly identified Islam as a major part of the problem. Developments including 
the terrorist attacks in Europe (Paris, Madrid, London), the Rushdie controversy in the United 
Kingdom, the process of the ‘re-Islamisation’ of young people born in Europe, questions about the 
separation of religion and politics (laïcité), struggles against anti-Semitism and even concerns about 
delinquency in poor districts predominantly inhabited by Muslims reinforced the view that a new 
phenomenon – a ‘crisis of Islam’ – called for drastic policy prescriptions. 
Over time, virtually all social problems involving European Muslim communities have been 
reconceptualised within the framework of Islam as a crisis phenomenon. Questions of Muslim political 
and social integration have become inextricably tied to the ‘Islam crisis’. Traditional ideas of a ‘clash 
of civilizations’ and the consequent need for intercultural policies to prevent crises involving Islam 
have dominated public debates surrounding the headscarf, French rioting and cartoon controversies. 
European policy-makers engaging in these debates are finding it difficult to agree on whether Europe’s 
Muslim citizens should be defined as minorities, immigrants or new Europeans. 
These multiple Islam crises and controversies are reflections of the existing gap between Europe’s 
policy elite and Muslim citizens living on the social periphery. The apparent failure of 30 years of 
European social policies to integrate Muslims is directly related to the lack of Muslim political 
participation in European affairs at both national and local levels on issues other than security and 
terrorism. Although the radicalisation of Islam is an important and urgent issue, the policy relevant 
concerns of most Muslims in Europe instead involve day-to-day problems of Islamophobia, worship 
management, and social, cultural and political exclusion – problems that tend to be ignored or poorly 
articulated at the policy level.  
To better understand the role of political Islam in European society today, it is necessary to examine 
Islamic movements from many different angles, including their European roots, the external influences 
of Muslim countries and the Islamic arguments of some of Europe’s most prominent Muslim leaders. 
Any balanced analysis should also question whether radicalisation is rooted in Islam per se or more the 
result of deliberate attempts by various religious actors to garner influence via communautarisme – the 
establishment of ethnic or religious communities separate from mainstream life.  
Imported crises? 
Islam is now considered a European religion. Crises involving Muslim populations in Europe are often 
blamed on influences from ‘foreign’ Islam, with blame most often assigned to two types of external 
phenomena. 
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la Mariée. Jeunes musulmanes, voile et projet matrimonial en France. Samir Amghar studies at Ecole des 
Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris. 
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First is what has been called ‘consular’ Islam. During the 1970s and 1980s, the first Muslim 
immigrants to Europe (mainly from Algeria, Morocco and Turkey) organised worship, mosque 
finances, imam activities and Koranic teaching through their countries’ consulates. The consulates 
were intent on diffusing Muslim protests or crises in Europe carried out in the name of Islam.  
More recently a second phenomenon – transnational or ‘foreign’ Islamic movements – have begun to 
compete for control over Muslims in Europe. These include the Tabligh from Pakistan, the Salafi 
movement from Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood organised by an Islamist elite in exile from 
Middle Eastern and North African countries. 
These ‘imported’ groups and other Muslim diaspora communities employ various means in their 
attempts to influence the ideological and normative landscape of Islam in Europe. During the 2003 
elections to establish the French council of Muslim worship organised by conservative French 
politician Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, Moroccan and Algerian consulates in France tried to 
influence the voting process. The goal was to secure a kind of national political majority among 
Muslims leaders from these countries via the elections. The Turkish diaspora has played an important 
role in advocating Turkey’s accession into the EU. After fatwas were issued related to the Iraqi and 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict from Youssouf Qaradawi (an Egyptian-Qatari theologian with the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement), many European Muslims chose to oppose the war by boycotting Israeli and 
American products. Some among these ‘foreign’ groups consider Palestinian suicide attacks as 
justified. Apparently, foreign Islamic activists living in Europe have been largely responsible for using 
violent videos advocating religious war against infidels (jihad), foreign fighter narratives and websites 
to recruit young European Muslims to fight among the so-called Chechen and Iraqi jihad networks. 
Such movements promoting violence and terrorism can serve as an outlet for disenfranchised and 
frustrated European Muslim youth seeking upward social mobility. While most vent their frustrations 
via peaceful means (more and more young Salafis in Europe are returning to their native Saudi Arabia 
or Gulf countries, for example), a small number choose jihad.  
European responses to ‘foreign’ Islam 
This incursion of ‘foreign’ Islamic movements has led European policy-makers to search for external 
solutions to European crises involving Islam. For example, in an attempt to fight radicalisation, 
France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands have launched expulsion 
campaigns against foreign imams to their countries of origin (Morocco, Algeria, Turkey). During the 
headscarf controversy, Nicolas Sarkozy travelled to the Al Azhar University in Egypt to obtain a fatwa 
from the Egyptian mufti Al Tantawi requiring girls to remove their veils at school. During the riots, 
French media described the young Muslim rioters as foreigners leading an “intifada des banlieues” 
with France becoming ‘Baghdad’, while some US commentators asserted that France was paying the 
price for its pro-Arab policies. Such clichés only serve to further convince Islamic actors of the need to 
be more effective in influencing policy-making affecting Muslims in Europe. Following Sarkozy’s 
Egyptian trip, Islamist movements led demonstrations against the veil law.  
Experience has shown that Muslim religious leaders are not able to defuse social crises affecting 
Muslims in Europe. The majority of young rioters in French cities were not practising Muslims, 
nevertheless it is interesting that a fatwa to stop the riots issued by the Union of France’s Islamic 
Associations of France (UOIF) – one of the principal federations of Islamic associations close to the 
Muslim Brotherhood and member of the French Council of the Muslim Faith – had no effect.  
At the same time, most European Muslim citizens rally around European values during such crises. 
During the veil and cartoon controversies European Muslims turned to their local judiciaries and the 
European Court of Human Rights in support of European values of freedom of belief, multiculturalism 
and even of secularity. In the same spirit, French rioters did not have clearly defined political 
proposals because they were not contesting the French model of integration, but rather sought its 
effective application. 6 | AMEL BOUBEKEUR & SAMIR AMGHAR 
The religious factor in the processes of political radicalisation 
Three distinct groups of activist Muslims can be distinguished according to their views on the 
relationship between religion and politics: Muslims who develop a ‘religious citizenship’, those who 
reject all non-Muslim political systems and an ultra-radical minority that places jihadist Islam at the 
core of their political commitment. 
For the first group, Islam is their starting point for a sense of citizenship and commitment to European 
society. Demonstrations against the veil law, for example, were for them a political negotiation 
emphasising the need for citizens’ participation to build a common society where Muslims act as a 
positive minority. They vote, engage in traditional secular political parties and participate in European 
political events such as the referendum on the European Constitution, organised events related to 
globalisation, etc. European Muslim leaders such as Tariq Ramadan contributed to the development of 
the concept of religious citizenship. 
We find the second group among Salafi and Tabligh disciples. Their conception of politics does not 
lead to violence, but rather a withdrawal from all political processes based on non-Muslim concepts. 
Their religiosity is sectarian in nature, meaning that they reject all interaction with non-Muslim 
institutions. Islam is for them universalistic and timeless. The only priority is to imitate the normative 
ways of the life of the Prophet. Thus, commitment to a secular state is not relevant. They do not 
conceptualise themselves within the framework of a non-Muslim political system. Withdrawal is 
considered to be preferable to participation. This group was not concerned by the demonstrations 
against the veil law or the publication of cartoon caricatures of the Prophet. 
The last group is the jihadist one. Although they do not share any particular social status, they do share 
the experience of social decline and displacement. Their reason for choosing violence stems less from 
religious conviction than from painful personal experiences of social and political injustice as a 
Muslim. They trust that Islam will defend Muslims from European/Western threats against them. They 
place  jihad at the core of their religious beliefs and rely on violence as the only way to defend 
Muslims from discriminatory policies enforced by EU member states. They may believe that the 
London and Madrid bombings were justified because, in their view, they forced Spain and the UK to 
consider the withdrawal of troops from Iraq more seriously. 
Integration rather than confrontation 
The role of Islam in Europe’s multiple crises is as complex as the various Muslim communities living 
in Europe. To better address such crises we need to understand the common interests shared by 
European institutions, EU member states and Muslim countries. These interests rarely converge, 
leaving European Muslims feeling trapped in a tug-of-war while Europe struggles to discern its 
changing identity. Muslim groups can be categorised according to their mode of political protest 
during European crises involving Islam, but they are extremely diverse. The single feature they have 
in common is their disappointment at European policies affecting their everyday lives in Europe. 
More than ever, Europe has a role to play in rethinking what can be proposed to its Muslim citizens in 
terms of political representation and participation. To minimise the likelihood of violence, Europe 
needs to create and make visible an alternative and common public space that provides its Muslims 
with a voice, especially concerning questions related to terrorism, religious radicalisation, 
Islamophobia, etc. 
The strength of the foundations of a new Europe will depend upon the extent to which Muslims are 
allowed to participate in the construction of a new European identity.  
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The Multiple Crisis in Dutch Parallel Societies 
Rob de Wijk* 
n the Netherlands the debate on the causes of radicalisation, terrorism and social unrest in the 
suburbs of major cities has been narrowed down to failed integration and the social and economic 
deprivation of ethnic groups. The emergence of a subclass of underprivileged ethnic minorities is 
thought to be the root cause of both the riots in Amsterdam and the emergence of terrorist networks 
such as the Hofstad Group, members of which stood on trial in early 2006. The reality, however, is 
more complex.  
In some of the major cities, parallel societies have emerged. However, the concept of a ‘parallel 
society’ is hard to define. Major cities saw the emergence of underprivileged groups of dissatisfied and 
disappointed ethnic minorities living in the poorest districts. But within these districts, a new middle 
class of ethnic entrepreneurs running a shadow economy has also emerged. The fact that these districts 
(partly) escape from government control makes them parallel societies.  
The emergence of parallel societies has three consequences. First, social and economic deprivation can 
lead to unrest, which is not necessarily related to cultural or religious grievances. Second, within 
parallel societies the new, better educated middle class become increasingly indignant at the lack of 
upward social mobility. Members of this group are prone to radicalisation. Third, due to their closed 
nature, parallel societies provide the perfect cover for criminal activities and consequently cover the 
infrastructure for terrorist networks. As a result social unrest, criminal activities, radicalisation and 
ultimately the development of terrorist networks could go hand in hand. Moroccans are the cause of 
many problems in both cases. Some youngsters terrorise entire neighbourhoods, others turn into 
terrorists.  
This paper tries to unravel the complex problem of the development of parallel societies in the 
Netherlands.  
Parallel societies in the Netherlands 
Contrary to public perception, according to two reports integration has not really been a failure.
1 
Nevertheless, there are some disturbing trends. First, non-western ethnic groups are structurally 
underprivileged. Second, inter-ethnic contact is decreasing. Third, ethnic and indigenous groups 
increasingly have negative feelings towards each other. The problems are concentrated in a limited 
number of districts in the four biggest cities. In Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague, one 
out of three residents is now of non-western origin. In the top ten ‘ethnic neighbourhoods’, an average 
of 74% are of non-western origin.  
In major cities a high degree of segregation of different population groups can be observed. Contact 
with the indigenous population is at its lowest in the neighbourhoods with large numbers of ethnic 
minorities. One study illustrated that if more than half of residents are from non-western ethnic 
minorities, contact and interaction between the indigenous and ethnic populations generally declines.
2 
People of Turkish and Moroccan origin have the strongest orientation towards their own ethnic group. 
Approximately two out of three living in the Netherlands focus on their own group. The study 
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Strategic Studies at Leiden University. He is also the Director of the Clingendael/TNO Centre for Strategic 
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1 Blok Commission, parliamentary commission on integration (Tweede Kamer 2003 – 2004, 28689. nr 17 and 
RMO advise nr. 37, The Hague, October 2005 (‘Niet langer met de ruggen tegen elkaar’).  
2 Gijsberts, M. and J. Dagevos, Uit elkaars buurt (Love they neighbour). Sociaal en Cultureel Plan Buro (SCB) 
10 October 2005.  
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concluded that “in the last ten years the frequency of social contact with the native population by 
Turks and Moroccans has declined (…) The social distance from the native population is thus not 
reducing. Of great significance in this interaction is that contacts between second-generation Turkish 
and Moroccan immigrants and the indigenous population have been steadily declining in recent years, 
a development that is linked to the steady rise in the numbers of ethnic minorities in the large cities 
(…) A further factor is the continuing high influx of Turkish and Moroccan ‘marriage migrants’ who 
(…) remain largely ensconced in their own community”. As a consequence, many also have a poor 
command of the Dutch language.  
Another problem is that second generation non-western minorities have a more negative attitude 
towards indigenous groups. More highly educated non-western minorities, however, have extremely 
negative feelings towards indigenous groups. This is explained by the poorly functioning labour 
market and a lack of upward social mobility.
3  
Until recently, most Dutch politicians turned a blind eye to these developments. By providing 
generous unemployment benefits, many assumed that the social security system would simply prevent 
the emergence of truly deprived areas and parallel societies. In contrast to the United States, ‘ghettos’ 
could simply not exist. They pointed at the large number of heavily subsidised welfare projects, whilst 
the police could still patrol the streets. They also argued that no easy conclusions could be drawn 
because no districts were dominated by a single ethnic minority.  
Nevertheless, the situation in the ‘Schilderswijk’ and the ‘Laakkwartier’ (The Hague), ‘het Oude 
Noorden’ (Rotterdam), Amsterdam-West, and the ‘Kanaleneiland’ (Utrecht) is alarming. These 
districts have developed into parallel societies with limited government control, a mixture of 
underprivileged ethnic groups and a new middle class of entrepreneurs. As municipalities put a lot of 
money into housing projects aimed at improving their quality of life, some of these neighbourhoods do 
not even look poor.  
Moroccans 
The main problem is second-generation Moroccans. Their ancestors were born in the rural area of the 
Rif mountains. This is an extremely poor and remote area in the northern part of Morocco, which 
successfully broke away from the influence of central government. As a result, education, 
infrastructure and food production lagged behind the rest of the country. The Rif area became 
increasingly poor and underdeveloped. After unsuccessful attempts to find jobs in Algeria, many 
Berbers came to The Netherlands in the 1970s. Due to recession many became employed during the 
1980s and 1990s. Supported by the government, they continued to stay in The Netherlands and were 
joined by family members from Morocco. The first generation is still largely unemployed, poorly 
educated and not integrated. Most first-generation Moroccans do not speak Dutch despite the fact that 
they have lived in the country for over thirty years. Consequently they are unable to assist their 
children in building a better future. Second-generation Dutch citizens born in Morocco also struggle 
with the language and lack proper education. Moroccans born in The Netherlands have grown up 
without proper support from their poorly integrated parents and were caught between the proud but 
repressive culture of the Berbers and the indifferent liberal culture of The Netherlands. As a direct 
result, a generation has been set adrift. Almost 40% of young second-generation Moroccan males are 
unemployed, against 23% of first-generation males. Of course there are many other poorly integrated 
minorities, but lacking the specific background of the Berbers, these groups cause less problems for 
public order.  
Problems with second-generation Moroccans are well illustrated by the case of the relatively wealthy 
Slotervaart district in Amsterdam. Slotervaart has some 45,000 inhabitants, with some 50% of 
autochthonous origin. Unemployment is at only nine percent. To improve quality of life, housing 
projects are in full swing. The municipality invests heavily in language courses as well as other 
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education projects, such as computer courses. Nevertheless, the tension is clearly visible. Petty crime, 
intimidation, harassment and no respect for the authorities, especially for the police, cause severe 
problems. On 23 April 1998 the first major clash between Moroccans and the police occurred. In 
January 2006 small-scale riots again took place, with citizens harassed, cars destroyed and windows 
smashed. The riots broke out after a Moroccan, fearing a police chase, had a fatal car accident trying 
to escape. The trigger for the riots was comparable to the situation in Clichy-sous-Bois, the working-
class Parisian suburb where an outbreak of French violence began on 27 October 2006. According to a 
report by the DCRG (Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux), the intelligence service of 
the French police, the riots were not caused by criminal gangs or Islam extremism, but by groups of 
angry, ‘economically excluded’ youngsters feeling neglected because of their social and ethnic 
background. In Amsterdam, as district chairman Henk Goettsch has argued, the problem centres 
around a small group of 100 to 150 Moroccans who are “completely and utterly mad” and who are 
“from top to toe unreligious and completely lost for Islam”.
4 Goettsch maintains that the only 
remaining option is to remove them from the street and put them in re-education camps for a long 
period of time. Politicians, however, fear that this measure conflicts with civil rights. This solution 
was put forward during the early 1990s by former Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, and now large parts 
of the population believe there is no other option but to send these groups to re-education camps.  
Schilderswijk: The poorest of them all 
A relatively prosperous district, Slotervaart’s ‘only’ problem is Moroccans terrorising the 
neighbourhood. In other districts the situation is far worse. The Schilderswijk in The Hague is The 
Netherlands’s poorest district. It is the archetype of a parallel society: 89% is of non-western origin 
with Turks, Moroccans and Surinamers as the dominant minorities. The Schilderswijk is the most 
densely populated area in the country (23,500 inhabitants per square kilometre, compared to 4,000 
inhabitants per square kilometre in the major cities). Finally, more than half of the population is below 
25, and some 80% are unemployed.
5 
Over the last 15 years, the Schilderswijk and to a lesser extent the adjacent Laakkwartier have 
developed into parallel societies, including a grey economy based on crime, semi-legal and illegal jobs 
and activities such as underground banking, caused in part by banks and insurance companies denying 
mortgages to residents in some postal code areas. Ethnic lawyers, housing agents, shops, bars, 
restaurants and phone houses focus exclusively on the neighbourhood. There is some evidence that the 
Sharia has been introduced in some of these neighbourhoods. Citizens focussing on the outside world 
watch Al-Jazeera and other Arabic stations, such as Al Manar (Libya), Sahar TV1 and Al Alam (Iran), 
Art Iqraa (Saudi Arabia), some of which were banned by the minister of justice in January 2006. The 
main problem is crime, burglaries, car thefts and youth gangs committing violence against fellow 
citizens, especially against Jews and gay people. Some criminal activities, such as the production of 
false passports, money laundering, robberies and the drugs trade, are related to terrorism.  
Having completely renovated many of the houses, the municipality created a district that is visually 
appealing. Ignoring the huge differences between ethnic groups in the city and the emergence of a 
parallel society, authorities argued that all citizens of The Hague are ‘Hagenaren’.  
In sum, the Schilderswijk has turned into a district separated from the city of The Hague with a 
different economic and social structure and people with distinct values. This development provided the 
perfect infrastructure for the supporters of terrorist networks such as the Hofstad Group, with some of 
its members living in the district and in adjacent neighbourhoods.  
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Action plans 
Recently the authorities have embarked on radical action plans to deal with the emergence of parallel 
societies. Undoubtedly the murder of Theo van Gogh and the riots in the French suburbs have 
contributed to new initiatives. Rotterdam has been a forerunner in these developments. In Rotterdam 
the political heirs of Pim Fortuyn (the politician who was murdered in 2002, having instigated radical 
political change), have experimented with various different measures. For example, a 120% minimum 
wage requirement was set for those citizens considering a house rent of over 250 euros. Radical 
measures were codified in the ‘Rotterdam Law’. By 1 January 2006, every major city can impose 
tough income requirements for accommodation seekers; can create favourable conditions for 
entrepreneurs in specific streets or neighbourhoods and can prevent jobless people moving from one 
city to another.  
Another interesting development is the so called ‘Rotterdam Code’ – a code of conduct for all citizens 
of Rotterdam. Aimed at improving integration, the code asks citizens of Rotterdam to accept rules, 
including the use of Dutch as a common language, and to actively reject discrimination, radicalisation 
and extremism. Together with the publication of the code in January 2006, the town council started to 
organise debates in the city’s districts between the 160 ethnic minorities and the native Dutch. The 
Rotterdam Code is part of a broader attempt to prevent the emergence of parallel societies and to 
reduce the danger of radicalisation and extremism. Rotterdam is also planning experiments to change 
the ethnic and social composition of neighbourhoods: housing projects that include more expensive 
houses for higher income groups; income quotas and relocation of the poorest people within the city 
and a ban on the influx of the more underprivileged into certain neighbourhoods.  
Another project called Wij Amsterdammers (‘We, the citizens of Amsterdam’), aimed specifically at 
reducing the risk of radicalisation, was set up after the assassination of Theo van Gogh in November 
2004. This project focuses primarily on combating terrorism by complementing the work of the police 
with specific integration projects aimed at preventing radicalisation by mobilising positive forces in 
society. So far the results of this seemingly soft approach are quite encouraging. In practice the 
approach is not that soft, because overt and covert counter terrorism measures are actually quite tough. 
On the one hand, authorities try to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. On the other hand, 
activities related to terrorism are continuously disturbed. It is probably this combination of hard and 
soft measures that makes the strategy of Job Cohen, the mayor of Amsterdam, quite successful. A 
major problem, however, is the lack of instruments for assessing the level of radicalisation and the 
processes taking place within these parallel societies.  
All action plans focus on winning the hearts and the minds of the people. The aim is to prevent social 
unrest, riots and radicalisation by improving social and economic conditions and facilitating 
communication between ethnic groups. Action plans most probably ease tensions, but it is unlikely 
that these measures can prevent radicalisation and terrorism as well.  
Fighting terrorists 
As has been argued before, within parallel societies the poor usually do not turn into fundamentalist 
extremists. Rather, the problem seems to lie with the more highly educated and the emerging middle 
class. Reinforced by relative success in the black and grey economies, many have turned their backs 
on Dutch society.
6 Some have become extremists. Radicalisation requires some degree of abstract 
thinking, which only the better educated are capable of. They transform religious, cultural, and 
historical grievances into action. This is exactly what happened with the Hofstad Group. 
The case of Mohammed Bouyeri serves as an example. During the 1990s he was active as a 
community worker in Amsterdam and a capable student who graduated from high school with good 
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marks. Without providing an alternative, the authorities closed down the local youth centre in 1998. 
Until then Bouyeri was quite successful in keeping young Moroccans off the street, but after losing the 
centre they had no other choice but to gather in the streets of their neighbourhood. This contributed to 
the riots of 1998 mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, Bouyeri fruitlessly attempted to establish a new 
youth centre, and as time progressed became radicalised and turned violent. He fought with the police 
and was sent to prison for twelve weeks. After being released, nine days after 9/11, he told his 
councillor about his new hero, Bin Laden. It is unclear to what extent his battle for a youth centre 
contributed to his radicalisation. His friends later observed that his detention and the death of his 
mother in December 2001 were the real turning points. It is, however, clear that his change of 
conviction cannot be solely attributed to an underlying hatred of the West in general and The 
Netherlands in particular. 
In a recent interview on Dutch television, the interior minister estimated that some 15 to 20 radicalised 
groups of some 10 to 15 members each were active in the country. Mohammed Bouyeri, who 
assassinated Theo van Gogh, was among the members of this Hofstad Group (Hofstad being another 
name for The Hague, where most bombings would take place). Other members of the sixteen that 
stood trial in 2005 and 2006 included Samir Azzuz, who was accused of planning attacks on 
Parliament, the offices of the Intelligence Services, the nuclear power plant of Borsele, Schiphol 
Airport and the Ministry of Defence in The Hague. The group’s characteristics are well known: 
•  Physically they lived in the parallel societies of The Hague, Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Utrecht.  
•  Spiritually, they lived in a virtual, anti-western world created on the internet and in private houses 
during sessions with self-appointed imams. They not only discussed Islam, but watched extremely 
violent jihadist videos and ‘snuff movies’ as well. 
•  Most member knew each other for a long time. Kinship and friendship were important.  
•  Some suspects, including Mohammed Bouyeri, Jason Walters and Ismail Akhnikh already had a 
reputation of violence. 
•  Most members were second-generation Moroccans who radicalised as teenagers. Some members, 
including Jason and Jermaine Walters and Martine van den Oever, were converts. 
•  Most were well educated. Some terminated their studies after being radicalised. The Koran rather 
than school became the source of all knowledge.  
As has been argued before, there is little evidence that parallel societies and social and economic 
deprivation contribute to radicalisation. The possible explanation lies in the role of the virtual umma 
for radicalised individuals – a Muslim world created behind closed doors and on the internet. In the 
absence of a formal Islamic doctrine, the ‘citizens’ of this virtual umma create their own truths, norms 
and values based on their own explanation of history and Koran. If needed, fatwas will be obtained 
from unknown internet imams.  
But terrorist networks can only develop with at least some form of (passive) support of a majority of 
the citizens. Therefore, parallel societies provide cover and infrastructure for networks of radicals and 
extremists, but the virtual umma reveal their true motivation. Their motivation usually comes not from 
social and economic grievances but from hate against the West. Conceptually, the emergence of home 
grown terrorism has a resemblance to communist cells in Europe during the late 19
th and early 20
th 
centuries and the insurgencies in former colonies. Consequently, counter-insurgency doctrine still 
provides some guidance for conceptual thinking. As a matter of fact, some elements of counter-
insurgency doctrine could be used to fight today’s home grown terrorists. To fight home grown 
terrorists in parallel societies, traditional counter-insurgency doctrine could be applied as follows:  
•  Protect the local, neutral and receptive part of the population against the ‘insurgents’. This 
requires improving the security of the neighbourhood by reducing criminal activities, especially 
those criminal activities in support of terrorism.  12 | ROB DE WIJK 
•  The reduction of crime is also necessary to deprive the ‘insurgents of their support system’. The 
objective is to physically and psychologically isolate home grown terrorists.  
•  Eliminate the insurgent’s intelligence network by closing down websites, television channels and 
the denial of internet access.  
•  ‘Hearts-and-mind’ activities to separate ‘insurgents from their base’. This requires dialogue 
between ethnic groups and projects aimed at improving the social and economic conditions of the 
population. Moderate ethnic groups must be convinced that the indigenous population is on their 
side.  
•  Well co-ordinated and continuous flow of intelligence based on human intelligence (HUMINT). 
This is an important by-product of the hearts-and-minds campaign. Close cooperation between the 
police and community workers is of crucial importance to know what is going on in parallel 
societies.  
•  Direct, small-scale, possibly covert action against the ‘insurgents’ to disturb their activities and 
arrest them if necessary. The use of force against home grown terrorists could jeopardise the 
hearts-and-minds campaign and should therefore be a measure of last resort.  
To many, this approach is rather controversial. For example, community workers will have difficulties 
using the hearts and minds campaign to improve the intelligence position of the authorities. Close 
cooperation with the police could lead to mistrust among the population and losing hearts and minds. 
However, considering the nature of home grown terrorism, there is no other alternative but to 
complement infiltration of terrorist networks with HUMINT by community workers. Needless to say, 
HUMINT is also useful in preventing riots and criminal activities.  
Why do they radicalise? 
If social and economic deprivation is not the root cause of radicalisation, the key question is why do 
Muslims radicalise. Bouyeri’s radicalisation mentioned above seems to fit a broader pattern. After 
9/11, many western European countries saw the emergence of networks of extremists, including the 
Hofstad Group. They were part of the emergence of an international salafist jihad as a force to be 
reckoned with in Europe.  
There are two sets of background contributing factors – origins and catalysts. Both are only marginally 
related to the development of parallel societies and underprivileged groups. The violent struggle 
against ‘corrupt, decadent and pro-western’ governments in the Arabic world which started in Egypt in 
the 1960s is considered as one of the root causes of the violent salafist jihad. The Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan in 1979 provided the international dimension. This was formalised by the shift from the 
near to the far enemy during the 1990s, especially with Osama bin Laden’s Declaration of War in 
1996 and his fatwas of 1998.  
Another root cause is Islamic culture. Fundamentalism is both a product of this development and 
Muslims’ attempt to deal with this development by rejecting western culture and influence, 
committing to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world. Muslim extremism is closely linked to 
this. Many Muslims consider fundamentalism as the solution to political and socio-economic problems 
that had become manifest in the 1970s. Due to increasing oil revenues, rapid but uneven 
modernisation, urbanisation and economic liberalisation took place, which led to social tensions in 
large parts of the Muslim world, especially the Middle East. Youngsters in the fast growing cities felt 
betrayed by their rulers, who failed to use the oil revenues to create a civil society based on Islamic 
values, but used the spoils for their own purposes instead. They also accused their leaders of becoming 
the puppets of western companies and governments. In Jihad vs. McWorld, Benjamin Barber argues 
that a collision is occurring between the forces of Islamic disintegral tribalism and reactionary 
fundamentalism (‘jihad’) and the forces of integrative modernism and aggressive economic and 
cultural globalism (‘McWorld’). Barber sees this as a “dialectic expression of tensions built into a 
single global civilization as it emerges against the backdrop of traditional ethnic and religious THE MULTIPLE CRISIS IN DUTCH PARALLEL SOCIETIES | 13 
divisions, many of which are actually created by McWorld and its infotainment industries and 
technological innovations”.
7 
Bin Laden’s goal, to unite all Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of the 
Caliphs – the ancient religious rulers – is widely shared by extremists, including the Hofstad Group. 
Agreeing with Bin Laden that the Caliphate can only be established by force, the overthrow of all 
Muslim governments is deemed necessary. In this view, governments are corrupt and influenced by 
the ‘Judeo-Crusader Alliance’, an alliance of Jews and Christians, embodied by Israel and the United 
States and supported by liberal democracies in general. This unholy alliance has occupied the land of 
Islam’s holy places (Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem) and is trying to crush Islam. To end this influence, 
the destruction of Israel and the United States is a prerequisite for reform of Muslim societies. In 
January 2006, Mohammed Bouyeri made his grievances abundantly clear during a three hour long 
testimony in court, mentioning the West’s hatred against Islam as his main grievance. 
In sum, the origins of radicalisation have little to do with parallel societies and the existence of 
underprivileged class. The same holds true for most of the catalyst factors. Our as yet unpublished 
piece of research on some 35 plots and successful acts of terrorism revealed a number of catalyst 
factors: 
0.  The ongoing struggle in the Middle East.  
0.  The war against terrorism and how it is fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. Especially the 
indiscriminate counter-insurgency tactics used by the Americans – Abu Graibh and Guantanamo 
Bay have become symbols of western attempts to oppress Muslims. 
0.  The ideology of the West, namely President Bush’s solutions for peace in the wider Middle East. 
0.  The successful attack of 9/11. It inspired young Muslims to turn into extremists and to join 
terrorist networks. The Hofstad Group is an example of this development. After 9/11, Europe 
witnessed an explosion in the number of attempted terrorist attacks, usually by home grown 
terrorist groups. Generally speaking, all successful attacks around the world are strong motivators.  
0.  Calls by radical leaders such as Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.  
The terrorist’s inspiration is usually of foreign origin. Similar conclusions were drawn by a Norwegian 
study. It concluded that home grown terrorists were motivated by ‘global jihad’ rather than domestic 
grievances.
8  
Mohammed Bouyeri declared war on The Netherlands. As there is no higher authority but Allah and 
Koran he rejected politicians and other authorities as ‘non-believers’ and saw democracy and the rule 
of law as antithetic to God's word and Sharia. His views were widely supported by other member of 
the Hofstad Group. As these grievances are common for the supporters of the international salafist 
jihad, they cannot be considered domestic catalysts. In the Netherlands few domestic catalysts could 
be identified: 
0.  Overreaction by local politicians. In 2002 the Netherlands Security and Intelligence Service AIVD 
found evidence that opinion leaders contributed to radicalisation of Muslims. Indeed, the movie 
‘Submission’, by MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh, undoubtedly contributed to the death 
of the latter. The recent cartoon affair is certainly also contributing to further radicalisation.  
0.  The lack of social mobility merely confirms the West’s attitude towards Muslims, but does not 
seem to be a root cause of radicalisation. The same holds true for social and economic deprivation.  
In sum, domestic grievances confirm the West’s negative attitude towards Islam. Home grown 
terrorists such as the Hofstad Group are part of the international salafi jihad. The movement is rooted 
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in the Arabic world, gained momentum after 9/11 and complemented Al Qaeda and its franchises with 
home grown radicals setting up local terrorist networks. Some of these loose networks have 
international connections as was the case with the Hofstad Group. Some of its members knew 
Abdelhamid Akoudad or Nauofel, who was arrested in Spain for his involvement in the 2003 
Casablanca bombings. The Hofstad Group and most of the Madrid bombers share the same Moroccan 
background. 
Conclusion 
The emergence of parallel societies contributes to fractured societies. When entire districts no longer 
take part in the democratic process, they pose a threat to the constitutional state. Parallel societies are 
not only the source of criminal activities, illegal economic practices, intimidation and violence, but 
also provide the perfect cover and infrastructure for networks of extremists. In The Netherlands, major 
cities have embarked on a strategy of dealing with parallel societies. Most initiatives are aimed at 
winning the hearts and minds of ethnic minorities by improving social and economic conditions and 
by improving interethnic communication. This could have two effects. First, improving the standard of 
living could increase stability and reduce the danger of riots. Second, winning the hearts and minds is 
a prerequisite for counter terrorist operations. Finally, local authorities should study counter 
insurgency doctrine and the lessons learned from military operations to find solutions for dealing with 
home grown terrorist networks. 
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Islam in Russia in 2020 
Alexey Malashenko* 
he influence of the ‘Islamic factor’ on the socio-political process in Russia has long become 
routine. People are accustomed to it and it arouses concern mostly in connection with sporadic 
excesses of terror that occur in the context of religious extremism. At the same time, 
demonstrations under Islamic slogans and efforts of Muslim politicians and clergy to provide religious 
grounds or religious interpretation for contradictions and conflicts promote slow but stable rising 
influence of Islam on society and politics. (The classical example is the Chechen war, which was 
proclaimed as a jihad by separatists and explained by some Russian politicians as a “clash of 
civilizations”.) 
According to the official census of 2002, there are 14.5 million Muslims in Russia. In reality, there are 
about 19 to 20 million (taking migrants into account), which is equivalent to 12% of the population.
1 
A consolidated Muslim community with a common religious centre has not formed in Russia. Islamic 
society of the country consists of two large groups. The first lives in the Volga-Ural region, Western 
Siberia and Moscow, where Tatars and Bashkirs live; and the second is the nations of the North 
Caucasus. The largest Islamic ethnicity in Russia is the Tatars (7 million people), followed by the 
Bashkirs (about 1.5 million people), and, amongst Caucasians, the Chechens (1 million people). 
In recent years, intensive migration of North Caucasian Muslims to the Central part of Russia has been 
observed. This phenomenon has aggravated inter-ethnic relations as well as those between different 
Muslim ethnic groups. 
The short history of Islam in Russia (after the disintegration of the Soviet Union) may be divided into 
several stages. The first stage was characterised by the beginning of religious revival, a rapid rise in 
the number of mosques, the forming of an Islamic educational system and a major emphasis on 
religion in people’s consciousness. The second stage, which took place in the middle of the 1990s, was 
characterised by the politicisation of Islam. Nation-wide religious-political groups, such as the Union 
of Muslims of Russia, the ‘Nur’ movement, and the ‘Refakh’ party, as well as regional religious-
political organisations appeared. At this time amongst Russian Muslims, primarily in the North 
Caucasus, the Islamist movement was formed which was greatly, although not entirely, provoked by 
the Chechen war. Islamists began to operate in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia. Centres 
of Islamism appeared in Tatarstan as well. The third stage occurred from 2000 to 2002, when the total 
level of Islamic politicisation fell, and Islamists of the North Caucasus suffered losses during the 
second Chechen campaign. 
However, from approximately the beginning of 2003, the activity of Islamic radicals was back on the 
up. The number of Jamaats in the North Caucasus grew and Islamists in the Volga region became 
more active despite the fact that in some specialists’ opinion they practically disappeared at the end of 
1990s. Thus, it is possible to assume that a fourth stage began during this period. 
The radical ideology of some Muslims in Russia proved more persistent than it was assumed to be. In 
our opinion, various independent factors contributed to this. First of all, the growth of Islamic 
observance contributes to the awakening of an interest among them in other areas besides just 
traditional Islam. The second factor is the formation among the young generation of Muslim clergy of 
various concepts coming from the Arabic East. Graduates of the Universities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Egypt and Turkey offer their compatriots some different, more radical (including Hanabilah) versions 
of Islam, as well as ‘Islam without maskhabs’ or, in other words, Salafism. Thirdly, as is typical 
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primarily in the North Caucasus, domestic Jamaats continue to propagandise the organisation of 
society on the basis of Shariat and advocate the idea that social justice may be ensured only through 
Islam. Fourthly, in connection with the previous thesis, Islam appears to be the natural form of protest 
against the injustice of local and central power and its corruption. Fifthly, aid continues to arrive from 
outside (though not on the previous scale). Finally, the radicals’ activities contribute to the 
confrontational atmosphere between Islam and the West.  
Although as noted above, Russia’s Muslims are not homogeneous, it is the radicals that most often 
manage to overcome ‘Tatar-Caucasian’ mutual alienation. The non-traditional interpretation of Islam 
currently being spread all around Russia transcends ethno-cultural barriers and consolidates Muslims 
on the basis of radical ideology. At the same time, contacts between Russia’s radicals and like-minded 
people from Central Asia are gradually growing. This is related to the periodical appearance of 
emissaries of Hizb at-Tahrir al-lslami in the Volga region and the South Urals.  
The integration process based on radical religious ideology is certainly dangerous because it supports 
extremist tendencies and as a result produces the basic conditions for destabilisation. However, it 
should not be forgotten that the sympathies of common Muslims frequently turn out to be on the side 
of Islamists, for Muslims understand Islam as connected to hopes for an improvement in their material 
position and securing social justice. Islamists, not being angels themselves, become allies of the 
disadvantaged part of society and gain popularity by virtue of their confrontation with authorities. In 
the North Caucasus there is a view that local Islamists are the single power that authorities seriously 
fear.  
Islamism has the greatest prospects in the North Caucasus. The waning of war in Chechnya (which in 
itself does not mean the end of the conflict) is occurring simultaneously with the revival of Islamist 
activity in the whole region. Authorities who fought ‘Wahhabists’ almost entirely by military means 
since 1999 have failed to prevent its expansion. As a result, Islamists have become the constant and de 
facto legitimate political power. It is indicative that the new separatists’ leader Abdul-Khalim 
Sajdullaev, who succeeded Aslan Maskhadov (killed in 2005), emphasises the creation of a 
‘Caucasian front’ of jihad. There is no common front, but the coordination between Islamist groups in 
separate republics is improving.  
The self-confidence of the Islamists is also evolving. An increasing number of them believe that they 
are not fighting against local administration and Moscow, but are part of a world jihad. Thus, they 
enhance their status not only in their own opinion, but also in that of the local and federal authorities 
opposing them. Authorities always emphasise that they are fighting not just bandits but, rather, the 
‘vanguard’ of international terrorism. 
It should be acknowledged that during the last two years, Russian special services achieved some 
success in annihilating several leaders of Jamaats in Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria as well 
as Chechen field commanders. In 2005, newspapers almost every week published stories about the 
successful operations of federal force units (‘siloviki’) against Islamists. 
At the same time, there is a feeling that the authorities did not manage to achieve the most important 
goal – to stop the influx of young 18-20 year olds into Islamism. Recently, a ‘rejuvenation’ of 
Islamism has occurred. This may be observed, for example, in the Muslim Volga region where groups 
of followers organise themselves around young and radical imams.  
Throughout the entire culturally Islamic area of Russia, Intra-Muslim confrontation, between 
traditionalists and those who try to train people to ‘Arabic Islam’, continues and is even increasing. 
This struggle is particularly intense because the influence of present clergy on their flocks, access to 
material and other secular blessings, and also their authority in front of secular power, which is afraid 
of losing control over Islam, are all at stake. (It should be noted that the emergence of the liberal trend 
towards ‘Euro-Islam’ did not receive support from clergy, is still unknown among believers and has 
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To some extent, processes occurring with Russian Islam may be linked to a generation gap. Imams 
aged 40-50 who obtained recognition during ‘perestroika’ (after the fall of the Soviet Union) are 
opposed by ambitious twenty-year-old young men. They received an education in the Arabic 
language, know fairly well Fiqh and Shariat, and, most importantly, have acquired and are improving 
the preaching skills. 
The intensity of the conflict greatly depends on tolerance of both sides, on the general situation in the 
country and also on the devotion of Russian Muslims to their historical and cultural traditions.  
Followers of traditional Islam are particularly anxious about the state of the educational process, 
training programmes of many madrasahs and institutes and the abundance of books that popularise the 
views of traditional Islamic fundamentalists such as Said Kutba, Yusef Karadavi and others. Such a 
situation is characteristic not only for Russia but also for all Muslim states in post-Soviet space. There, 
attempts to found educational and informative programmes that may help to move the believers out of 
the influence of Islamists are being undertaken.  
In the past decade, Russian Muslims have persistently striven for integration into the world of umma. 
In certain cases, this tendency may contradict Moscow’s official policy. Thus, the Muslim clerical and 
political elite opposed Kremlin pro-Serbian policy and expressed solidarity with Muslims in Bosnia 
and in particular in Kosovo. Yet, the Kremlin position in the conflict around Iraq in 2002 was 
generally supported. Moreover, it is known that in Dagestan there was an initiative to help Iraqis by 
sending Caucasian volunteer units of (according to some data) up to 6,000 people. At that time, the 
head of the Central Clerical Board of Muslims of Russia Talgat Tatdzhutdin publicly declared ‘Jihad 
to America’. (This fact significantly irritated the Kremlin.) In 2006, Russian Muslims expressed their 
solidarity with people of their faith during the scandal with the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad 
published in some European newspapers. In the capital of Dagestan, Makhachkala, a protest march 
was organised, and acting prime minister of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov expelled the Danish 
humanitarian mission from the country. (Moscow later disavowed knowledge of this decision.)  
It is obvious that the central object of general umma unity is still the conflict in the Middle East. After 
the unconditional support that was given to Palestine by the Soviet Union, Russian Muslims were 
genuinely disappointed by the new policy of maintaining equal distance from the opposing sides. That 
is why president Putin’s invitation to Hamas to send a delegation to Moscow, after it had just won at 
the parliamentary elections in 2006, was greeted by Russian Muslims with great satisfaction. 
(Incidentally, Hamas is not listed by Russia as a terrorist organisation.) 
In 1998-1999 The Union of Muslims of Russia made the first (unsuccessful) attempt to bring Russia 
into the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In 2002-2003 this idea was developed by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and approved by Vladimir Putin. And in spite of the fact that Russia still 
has not received the status (and it is unknown if it will) of an OIC observer, the fact that this question 
was even discussed gives Russian Muslims additional opportunity for self-identification as a full 
member of the umma.  
Confessional self-identification may be in discord with one’s civil identity. In other words, the sense 
of affiliation with Islam becomes more acute than the sense of belonging to the nation state. In the 
Russian poly-confessional state, this contradiction is catalysed by complicated interactions between 
major religions. The proclaimed constitutional equality of all religions is not always observed. The 
Russian Orthodox Church (the majority of population of the country practises Orthodox Christianity) 
confidently lays claim to the special, leading role in the life of society while underlining its 
exceptional importance to the building of a nation state. Ideologists of the Church are fully confident 
that it is Orthodox Christianity that must form the basis of the ‘Russian national idea’. Attempts to 
develop it have been made throughout the past decade but the process has never been completed.  
The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Aleksii II, consistently ranks between 10
th and 
15
th place in the list of top Russian politicians. The Church actively penetrates the army and primary 
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There have been cases when representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church unofficially impeded the 
building of new Mosques, the registration of Islamic communities and creation of Islamic centres.  
All of these facts cannot but irritate the Muslim elite, the overwhelming majority of whom have a 
benevolent relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church. Considerable conflicts are concealed 
behind the façade of the official inter-confessional dialogue, and from time to time they leak out onto 
the pages of newspapers and magazines and into speeches of some representatives of the clergy. (For 
example, Andrey Kuraev, one of the leading ideologists of the Russian Orthodox Church, stated that it 
was necessary to establish total state control over Islamic education.) 
The latest conflict to break out over national Russian symbols is, in our opinion, the most absurd. The 
crown and the orb topped with crosses have always been depicted on the State Emblem of Russia. In 
the fall of 2005, the All-Tatars public centre unexpectedly demanded the removal of this sign of 
Christianity from the State Emblem. A rather heated dispute began. Several well-known religious 
figures, such as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia Nafigulla Ashirov, were 
involved. Picked up by mass media, this senseless debate contributed to the rise of mutual irritation 
between Muslims and Orthodox believers.  
Russia did not avoid the notorious ‘headscarf conflict’. The Union of Muslim Women of Tatarstan 
demanded that women be allowed to be photographed for passports with a headscarf on. Secular 
authorities, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then later judicial bodies, reacted quite 
tactfully and permitted Tatar ladies to be photographed for the official documents with their head 
covered. As a result, this appeal of the Union of Muslim Women did not receive any significant 
backing from society and the conflict dissipated. 
Another, more noticeable, attempt to bring back some standards of an Islamic way of living came in 
the form of appeals to restore the right to polygamy. In Russia, such discussions have gone on since 
the mid-1990s. One of those backing this idea is Ruslan Aushev, the former president of Ingushetia. 
The idea was also discussed at length by some Tatar politicians. In 2005, Ramzan Kadyrov insisted on 
legalising polygamy, arguing that the number of women in the republic exceeds the number of men by 
ten percent and that polygamy would be the only way to rescue the Chechen nation from extinction. 
Some politicians and religious figures of Dagestan regard this idea favourably, and of course Islamists 
support it unconditionally. It should be noticed that while polygamy is already practised by prosperous 
people, it is unlikely to become widespread. (Occasionally it is not clear what is behind the aspiration 
to legalise polygamy – the willingness to affirm Islamic custom or to legitimise someone’s family 
status.) 
However, it should be accepted that the re-incorporation of Islamic models of behaviour into society 
really exists. One can judge it by how strictly the fasting and all sorts of food prohibitions are kept, in 
particular, those on alcohol. 
In the first part of 1990s, some politicians and experts expressed the view that “Islam is in fashion”. Of 
course, there is some truth in such an approach. However, re-Islamisation of Russian Muslims turned 
out to be much more profound than was imagined, and it appears that this process is still going on. 
What can be expected in 15 years, in 2020? What will happen to the Russian Islamic community in 30 
years?  
The number of Muslims will increase and may amount to about 25 million people, taking into account 
the population growth particularly in the North Caucasus, as well as the current rate of migration. And 
if one takes into account that the total number of Russian citizens will decrease to 130 million, the 
‘percentage of Muslims’ will be 17 to 19 (with or without migration.) Simultaneously, the internal 
conversion of Muslims will occur, and the majority of them will be from the Caucasus. The number of 
emigrants from the Caucasus settled in Russian cities will increase in absolute and relative terms. 
Two contrary tendencies will become more marked in the future. On the one hand, there will be the 
dispersion of Muslims, and in particular Caucasians, in Russian society. On the other hand, they will 
aspire to protect their identity and ethnic character, especially during the first stage of their business. ISLAM IN RUSSIA IN 2020 | 19 
Hence, the new generation of politicians who will represent the interests of various groups will be 
based on different ethno-confessional affiliations. 
Quasi-religious movements may appear. (Something similar took place in the 1990s, but an 
authoritative all-Russian party with social-Islamic motivation was never founded.) Such movements 
will not be of an inherently separatist nature.  
Russia and the rest of the world will not ‘get rid of’ radical Islam, which will continue to exist in 
different forms, such as Wahhabism, Islamism and Fundamentalism. It will remain at its most 
pronounced in the North Caucasus. However, centres of religious radicalism will remain in the Volga 
region as well because of the preaching activities of a new generation of the clergy, who received 
education in Arab countries. 
The next 15 years of terrorism under religious slogans will continue to be a disaster in Russia and 
beyond. 
However, in spite of these circumstances, the authorities (and federal authorities as well) will have to 
begin a systematic dialogue with moderate Islamists. 
Ethno-confessional relations will remain somewhat strained, with direct clashes. Such a situation may 
be observed already now. And if the administration of all levels, leaders of ethnic communities, and 
authoritative priests play the waiting game, such conflicts will become more frequent and violent 
(right up to ‘mini-wars’). 
Islamophobia will rise and will become a part of political and domestic consciousness and in the 
behaviour of a significant proportion of Russian citizens. Such a rise will be furthered not only by 
ethno-confessional problems, but also by mutual prejudice between the West and Muslim world. 
Thus, Russia will not become the Muslim state which is predicted by some of our contemporaries – 
political scientists and writers. But the ‘Islamic factor’ will become more visible in social life and in 
the orientation of various political groups.  
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